This paper empirically examines business starts and deaths in relation to US public 
Introduction
The OECD (1996) and others have argued that entrepreneurship and innovation will facilitate economic growth and the competitive advantage of nations in the 21 st century. Much evidence, albeit not all, indicates small high-tech companies contribute disproportionately to innovation and economic growth (the World Bank, 1994 , 2002 . Drivers of entrepreneurial activity have been extensively researched in the US and internationally. Empirical evidence points to a number of factors, including market conditions, education, information, spillovers and agglomeration (Audretsch, 2007a,b; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2007) . Empirical evidence has likewise confirmed the role of personal bankruptcy laws to mitigate the cost of failure (Fan and White, 2003; Berkowitz and White, 2004, Armour and Cumming, 2008) , taxation to minimize moral hazard and maximize the returns to entrepreneurship (Keuschnigg, 2004a,b; Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2003, 2004a,b) , and legal and institutional settings that protect property rights and mitigate the start-up costs and costs of failure (La Porta et al., 1999; Djankov et al., 2002; Glasear et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Levine, 2005; Klapper et al., 2006; Chavis et al., 2009; Nofsinger and Reca, 2009 ).
The growing awareness of the role for public policy in promoting entrepreneurship has led to increasing efforts for governments around the world to spur entrepreneurial activity and The increasing presence of government in stimulating entrepreneurial activity gives rise to a growing need to reexamine the role of public policy on entrepreneurial activity. What exactly is the effect of policies like bailouts and subsidies on stimulating entrepreneurial activity?
How do other public policy tool mechanisms such as government transfers, and labor and bankruptcy laws influence the rate of business start-up activity?
In this paper we focus on testing the effect of three main public policy instruments on stimulating entrepreneurial activity. First, we consider the size of government. Measures of the size of government include government consumptions expenditure, transfers and subsidies, as well as social security payments. On one hand, we may conjecture that this should help entrepreneurial activity as subsidies help promote risk taking and social security payments lower the expected costs of failure. On the other hand, we may conjecture that subsidies and social security exacerbate effort related moral hazard costs, thereby worsening an entrepreneurial climate.
Second, we consider takings and discriminatory taxation. Our empirical measures include tax revenue, top marginal income tax rates, indirect tax revenue, and sales tax. Consistent with prior literature (Keuschnigg, 2004a,b; Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2003, 2004a,b) , we expect taxation to mitigate entrepreneurial activity.
Third, we consider labor laws and the labor environment. In particular, we study for labor focus on minimum wage legislation, the number of government employees and labor union density. We may conjecture that minimum wage legislation imposes more stringent costs on entrepreneurial start-ups, thereby reducing the number of start-ups. Similarly, states that have a large government sector offer employment opportunities that mitigate the incentives to become self-employed. Further, unions provide labor-friendly environments with active lobbying on behalf of employees but comparatively higher costs on firms, thereby diminishing the incentives for employees to become entrepreneurs and start their own firms.
Our measures of the size of government, takings and discriminatory taxation and labor laws and the labor environment are based on newly available indices described in Karabegovic and McMahon (2008) . Importantly, these indices vary across states and over time. We match these data to the most recent (as at July 2009) census data on business starts and deaths in the US, which covers the 1995-2005(Q1) period. The data indicate robust evidence that business starts with 1-4 employees are promoted by fewer government transfers, lower taxation, and lower minimum wages. Transfers and subsidies help only insofar as they reduce the number of business deaths. For larger business starts with up to 19 employees, the most important policy mechanism is labor frictions, which are negatively associated with business starts. Overall, the data are strongly consistent with the view that a larger government sector does not stimulate but rather stifles business creation in terms of the overall number of new firms created.
Our findings are robust to assessment of business creation in terms of levels and rates of changes in levels, as well as assessment of business starts versus net changes in terms of business starts -deaths. Our empirical measures are based on state wide data, and robust to state fixedeffects regression specifications. Our analyses are robust to consideration of delayed impacts of policies, as well as controls for economic conditions, venture capital investment, bankruptcy laws and other factors. It is noteworthy that our data do confirm a positive impact of venture capital on business creation (consistent with Keuschnigg, 2004a,b; Samila and Sorenson, 2009 ) as well as a positive effect of lenient personal bankruptcy laws (consistent with Fan and White, 2003; Berkowitz and White, 2004) .
As an extension to our analysis of the quantity of business creation, we further analyze the quality of business creation. Proxies for quality include subsequent years' venture capital levels (total dollar values and total numbers of deals) and patent counts in each state. The most robust result among the policy variables that might influence quality is that government transfers and subsidies are positively associated with entrepreneurial quality in terms of venture capital deals, venture capital dollars as well as patent counts.
Taken together, the data shed light on a number of implications for developing effective public policy towards entrepreneurship. Policy instruments can influence both the quantity and quality of new firms, and the impacts are not always in the same direction for any given instrument. Based on the data examined, government transfers and subsidies appear to facilitate higher quality entrepreneurial activity, just as lenient personal bankruptcy laws stimulate the number of new firms created. However, transfers and subsidies, takings and discriminatory taxation, and labor frictions all appear to stifle the numbers of new firms created.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the new indices for government, taxation and labor, and the predicted effects on business creation. Section 3 introduces the data and provides summary statistics. Multivariate regression analyses are presented in section 4.
Section 5 provides and extended discussion of the results, as well as acknowledges limitations and considers extensions. Concluding remarks follow in section 6.
Policy Instruments
In this section we examine and discuss the role of government transfers and subsidies, takings and discriminatory taxation, and labor policies in stimulating business creation. As well,
we explain the construction of indices used to measure these policy instruments across each of the US states and over time.
Government Transfers and Subsidies
Government transfers and subsidies have the potential to encourage entrepreneurial activity. Arguments in support of government transfers and subsidies stimulating entrepreneurship require that government is well informed. On one hand, if the government policymakers are well informed about the productivity across all current and potential future entrepreneurs, then redistributive policies with transfers and subsidies can be optimally designed to mitigate distortions (Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2003) . Transfers and subsidies not only redistribute between persons of different productivity but also in different states of nature (Boadway et al. 2004) . Government policy can be used to bring effective education and training to an efficient level where private markets do not work well. Government policy can overcome capital gaps in financing entrepreneurs where investors face institutional constraints on financing entrepreneurship. Government transfers may also provide endowments to potentially skilled entrepreneurs to stimulate risk taking, and facilitate agglomeration and information sharing.
On the other hand, there are arguments against transfers and subsidies which for the most part are based on the premise that it is highly unlikely that government policymakers are well informed about productivity across all current and potential entrepreneurs in practice. As such, transfers and subsidies are more likely to create distortions. The composition of government transfers and subsidies may induce moral hazard and adverse selection costs that mitigate the quality and quantity of entrepreneurial activity, thereby encouraging inefficient business creation and continuation, while at the same time stifling efficient business creation.
At the end of the day, arguments on either side about whether transfers and subsides stimulate or stifle entrepreneurship can quickly become elevated to political rhetoric without empirical scrutiny. In this paper we empirically assess the impact of transfers and subsidies while acknowledging a priori that political ideology could lead us either way in terms of possible impacts on business creation. We use a new index that measures that quantity of transfers and subsidies, and this index varies across each of the US states and over time for [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . The index values are calculated using a mini-max formula: (V max -V i )/(V max -V min )*10 where V max is the largest value found for transfers and subsides per GDP in a state, V min is the smallest, and V i is the observation to be transformed. The calculation includes all years of data to all for comparisons over time and across states (for details, see Karabegovic and McMahon, 2008) . The index definitions and values are summarized herein in section 3 below. The indices range from 0 to 10, where 10 is the least amount of government transfers and subsidies. The indices are a relative ranking.
Prior work that has used these indices (e.g. Sobel, 2008a,b) assumes that the Karabegovic and McMahon (2008) indices measure the quality of government. Importantly, size does not equate to quality. A larger government section is not necessarily a bad one. Whether or not a greater presence of government it is bad or at least has bad effects on entrepreneurship is a matter worthy of empirical scrutiny. One cannot make this assertion before empirical testing.
In addition to government transfers and subsides, in our empirical tests we further consider the effect on business creation in relation to the size of government per GDP, as well as the amount of social security payments per GDP in each state. These variables are calculated in the same way as the index for government transfers and subsidies per GDP, and reported in section 3. On one hand, a greater government sector and social security payments may induce risk taking and entrepreneurial activity. On the other hand, it is plausible that the size of government and social security mitigates business creation as governments are more likely to pursue superfluous activity as they expand (Karabegovic and McMahon, 2008) , thereby diminishing the entrepreneurial climate in a region. There are both protective and productive functions of government, and it is plausible that all of the state governments in the US are at a sufficient size to perform the sufficient amount of both of these functions, and if so, this may imply that larger governments are more likely to pursue activities that are unrelated to stimulating business creation. Further, social security payments for retirement, disability insurance and the like that are mandated by the government reduce flexibility and freedom of contract, thereby potentially imposing terms that might otherwise be at an inefficient level and in turn stifling business creation. Below, these competing claims are assessed empirically with the use of different proxies for the effect of government in our empirical analyses.
Taxation
Taxation in the US is progressive in the sense that higher earners pay higher tax rates.
Theoretical work has well established the proposition that progressive taxation reduces the returns to entrepreneurship and induces entrepreneurial moral hazard (Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2004 ).
Of course, taxes which are at such a low level where the rule of law and other necessary elements are not in place to conduct economic activity, an increase in taxation can stimulate entrepreneurial activity. But as long as taxes are at a level to cover sufficiently productive and protective functions of government (which is likely the case in all of the US states), progressive taxation lowers the marginal benefits to additional effort, reduces the returns to risk taking and generally stifles entrepreneurial activity.
The same mini-max index formula is used taxation as it was for government transfers described in subsection 2.1. In section 3, we report taxation index values for tax revenue / GDP, the top marginal tax rate, indirect tax revenue / GDP and sales tax revenue / GDP. Our index for the top marginal tax rate accounts for both the rate and the threshold value for which it applies (Karabegovic and McMahon, 2008) . Total tax revenue accounts for various corporate and capital taxes not included in the other three components. Capital gains taxes are picked up in total tax revenues, and do not significantly differ across US states (http://www.taxfoundation.org).
Note that taxation and government transfers and subsidies are not necessarily the opposite sides of the same balance sheet. However, there are many intergovernmental transfers that break the link between taxation and spending at the state level. Therefore, it is relevant to assess separately taxation and spending. Further, note that differences between corporate and income taxation can impact the choice between employment and entrepreneurship. Higher corporate taxes relative to higher income taxes are expected to be associated with lower levels of new business starts (Keuschnigg, 2003) . We empirically assess the difference between corporate and income taxes in our empirical analyses.
Labor Frictions
Our third index focuses on labor laws and the labor environment. In particular, we study for labor focus on minimum wage legislation, the number of government employees and labor union density. The index values of each of the policy instruments summarized and described further below in section 3. Other pertinent data are summarized alongside these indices. [Insert Table 1 About Here]
Data and Summary Statistics

Data
The main explanatory variables of interest in our model are the public policy variables summarized in section 2. These variables are created on a state-wide basis and matched to the state where the business is located. The policy variables are computed by the Fraser Institute (Karabegovic and McMahon, 2008) . It is worth mentioning that there is a one-quarter lag between the business creation variables and public policy indices, since the former is computed at the end of the first quarter of each subsequent year but the latter is calculated for the calendar year. As a result, there might be a lead-lag relationship between the public policy indices and business establishment data considering the time needed for the economic policies to take effective. Below, we empirically assess this possibility to allow for an additional 1 year lag (over and above the 1 quarter lag) and find the results to be robust.
Also, we introduce a variable for the corporate income tax at both state and federal level, 
Summary Statistics
As indicated in Table 1 , the average state level establishment births decrease substantially in the size of the business, varying from 9032 for business with 1-4 employees to 812 for that of establishment with more than 10 employees. The establishment birth rates reveal the same pattern, decreasing from 16.7% to 6.2%. The average establishment change, which considers both births and deaths, is 851 for size 1-4 business, while the total establishments for size 10-19 business seldom changes, with a an average of 4. As presented in Table 1 Table 2 provides comparison of means and medians tests of U.S starts and deaths data for establishments in relations to different levels of the three major policy indices. For each index, the whole sample is classified into High or Low group based on whether the index value is higher or lower than its median. We then compute the mean and median value for both groups and test whether there is statistically difference between them.
[Insert Table 2 About Here] wages and the like) show higher levels of venture capital deals and patents, and these differences are significant at the 1% level for venture capital and the 10% level for patents. Below, we assess in with the use of panel data regressions whether these results hold in a multivariate setting. Table 3 presents a correlation matrix for the main variables used in the multivariate tests provided in the next section. The correlations are consistent with the comparison tests in Table 2 discussed above. But as we can see in Table 3 , there is a strong positive correlation between the three major public policy indices, which varies from 0.34 to 0.47. The next section explores these relationships further in a multivariate context and with consideration to collinearity and causality issues, among other things.
[Insert Table 3 About Here]
Regression Analyses
Quantity of Business Creation
Our regression analyses for the quantity of new business creation are presented in Table   4 . Below in subsection 4.2 we extend our analysis by examining various proxies for the quality of business creation.
In Table 4 we use standard OLS regressions with state fixed-effects regressions to account for differences across states that are not picked up by our time-varying policy variables of interest. We present 10 different model specifications to highlight robustness. [Insert Table 4 About Here] Models 6-10 consider dependent variables for new firm starts / population. Model 6 provides dependent variables analogous to Model 1, with the exception of using the time invariant bankruptcy index and state dummy variables (48 states with one state dropped to avoid perfect collinearity) instead of state fixed effects. Model 7 uses in each of the different policy indices defined in Table 1 and described above in section 2. Models 8-10 use the variables for public policy that are aggregated (on an equal weighted basis) across each of the subcomponents of the size of government, takings and discriminatory taxation and labor index. Models 8, 9 and 10 differ by considering the birth rate for firms with 1-4, 5-9 and 10-19 employees, respectively.
All of the models exhibit high adjusted R 2 values. 
Quality of Business Creation
To complement our analyses of the total number of new firms created, in this subsection we examine whether policy has an impact on the quality of entrepreneurial activity. [Insert Table 5 About Here]
In Models 11 and 12, the dependent variable is venture capital deals / population, and different explanatory variables are reported to show robustness. Models 11 and 12 show a negative coefficient for size of government transfers and subsidies, and these results are significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The economic significance in Model 11 is such that a 1 standard deviation change in the government transfers and subsides index gives rise to a 8.13% reduction in the number of venture capital deals / population (and the size of this effect is a 27.31% reduction in Model 12). Similarly, in Model 13 for the dollar value of venture capital deals, and in Models 14 and 15 for the number of patents, the effect of size of the size of government transfers and subsidies is significant at the 1% level, and shows and 1 standard deviation increase in the index reduces the dependent variable in Models 13, 14 and 15 by 64.1%, 15.3% and 15.1%, respectively. As the index is defined such that more transfers and subsidies are associated with lower values of the index, this means transfers and subsidies are consistently associated with higher values of our proxies for the quality of entrepreneurial activity.
It is noteworthy that the data show transfers and subsidies are associated with fewer new business starts in the prior subsection, but higher quality entrepreneurs in this subsection. The evidence is consistent with prior theoretical work that unfettered markets, such as those in the U.S., produce too many low quality entrepreneurs (Parker and van Praag, 2008) .
Note in Models 12, 13 and 15 that social security payments are associated with lower levels of entrepreneurial quality. Further, in Models 11-13, government employment / total employment is associated with lower levels of entrepreneurial quality, but this effect is not significant in Models 14 and 15. Likewise, indirect tax revenue is a significant factor in some of the models, but the significance and the sign of the effect are not robust across any of the specifications.
The control variables in Table 5 showing dual causality between venture capital and patents (Ueda and Hirukawa, 2008) . We note collinearity between venture capital dollars and venture capital deals in Models 14 and 15 gives rise to the negative significant coefficient for venture capital dollars; but regardless, inclusion or exclusion of one or the other venture capital variable does not materially impact any of the other variables pertaining to the tested hypotheses.
Discussion
The evidence in section 4 is in sharp contrast to the findings in Sobel (2008a,b) , particularly in relation to the effect of government on venture capital and start-up activity. The reason for these differences is as follows. Second, we examine the empirics with time-series and cross-sectional data, while Sobel (2008a,b) examines only cross-section data without considering differences over time. Time series changes reveal important relationships between the variables, and it is widely regarded that panel datasets
should not be estimated as cross-sectional datasets.
There are two other papers on related topics that are worth mentioning in this context. we used state fixed effects to pick up state differences not captured in the policy variables considered. Further work could explore differences in other factors and over time to understand the relative importance of variables not explicitly measured herein.
In our empirical analyses we study the period from 1995 to 2005(Q1). We considered subperiods within these dates and found the results to be robust. Our analyses are based on the most recent data available from the US census (as at June 2009). Whether the results apply to the current economic crisis will only be known where the US census releases new data in futures years.
In the analysis of the influence of government transfers on business starts, we do not limit ourselves to the narrowly defined policies, which is directly related to governmental support for certain firms, such as directed government venture capital programs. On the contrary, we examine the broad transfer payment, which is more reasonable considering that we are looking at the aggregated measures of start-ups. Whether the effect is mainly driven by the aggregated level state policies or the direct support to new starts could be an interesting question for future research.
In this paper we do not make claims about welfare effects (see, e.g., Schumpeter, 1934; Baumol, 1990; North, 1990) . In related theoretical work, Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003) find that nonredistributive taxes have neutral welfare implications, while progressive taxes always impair entrepreneurship and the effect on welfare is positive or zero, depending on the specification of incentives in the model. Similarly, Sobel (2008a,b) and others discuss the role of policy in influencing proxies for the quality of entrepreneurship, but this analysis is not based on time series changes in public policies and rather cross sectional analyses across states. As well, prior work has not fully measured the effects of entrepreneur related policy changes on overall societal welfare. Further, in this paper we do not distinguish between different types of entrepreneurship, such as by race or gender. Our analyses are based on US Census data on overall business starts and deaths. Recent work with survey data from the Kauffmann foundation examines entrepreneurship by race and gender (Fairlie, 2009; Fairlie and Robb, 2009 ).
In this paper we limit ourselves to the narrow question of how public policy affects business creation in terms of births and deaths, and the change in births and deaths over time, and proxies for entrepreneurial quality in terms of venture capital and patents. Ideally, we would like to be able to track what happened with these new firms that started up in response to policy changes, and how measures of overall state welfare changed in response to policy changes.
These questions are beyond the scope of our current data, but would be an interesting avenue for future research.
Conclusions
This paper empirically examines the relation between business starts and deaths in relation to US public policy using the most recent (as at 07 /2009 In addition to these analyses of the quantity of new business creation, we further examined the quality of entrepreneurial activity with proxies such as subsequent venture capital deals and patent counts. The data examined indicate government transfers and subsidies appear to play a more positive role by stimulating entrepreneurial quality.
The policy implications from the empirical analysis are straightforward. New business starts for the smallest firms are discouraged by a greater presence of the government sector.
Larger start-ups, particularly those firms starting with more than 10 employees, are more closely connected to labor policies, not government transfers and taxation. Lenient personal bankruptcy laws, by contrast, stimulate entrepreneurial activity. Higher corporate taxes relative to income taxes reduces new business starts.
We further note that policy instruments not only influence the quantity of entrepreneurial activity but also the quality. The data indicate government transfers and subsidies appear to facilitate higher quality entrepreneurial activity. Other policy instruments including taxation and labor frictions, however, reduce the quality of entrepreneurial activity.
In this paper we do not consider overall welfare impacts of these policies. Rather, we only empirically study business starts and deaths, and proxies for the quality of entrepreneurial activity. Future work could use the new policy indices presented here in conjunction with other data to enable analyses of policy changes on more broadly based welfare implications associated with business creation. The U.S. establishment births of year t/t+1 is the numbers of physical locations, where business is conducted, or services or industrial operations are performed, which have zero employment in the first quarter of year t and 5 to 9 employment in the first quarter of year t+1. The U.S. establishment birth rate of year t/t+1 is the US establishment births for size 5-9 of year t/t+1 divided by the US initial year establishments for size 5-9.
http://www. census.gov 8.0% 7.8% 1.6% 5.0% 15.8%
U.S. Establishment Births Rate for Size 10-19
The U.S. establishment birth rate of year t/t+1 is the US establishment births for size 10-19 of year t/t+1 divided by the US initial year establishments for size 10-19.
http://www. census.gov 6.2% 5.8% 1.6% 3.4% 12.8% U.S. Establishment Change for Size 1-4
The U.S. establishment change for size 1-4 of year t/t+1 is the difference of the total establishment for size 1-4 of year t+1 and year t .
http://www. census.gov 851 384 1621 -3874 15321 U.S. Establishment Change for Size 5-9
The U.S. establishment change for size 5-9 of year t/t+1 is the difference of the total establishment for size 5-9 of year t+1 and year t . The U.S. net establishment rate of change for size 1-4 of year t/t+1 is the US establishment change for size 1-4 of year t/t+1 divided by the US initial year establishments for size 1-4.
http://www. census.gov 1.54% 1.42% 1.86% -5.53% 7.96% U.S. Net Establishment Rate of Change for Size 5-9
The U.S. net establishment rate of change for size 5-9 of year t/t+1 is the US establishment change for size 5-9 of year t/t+1 divided by the US initial year establishments for size 5-9. Table 1 . State fixed effects are used for all Models. The independent variables are lagged by 1 year in each model, with the exception of GDP/capita which is contemporaneous with the dependent variable. The dependent variables are as indicated in each Model. *, **, *** significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
Model 11
Model 12 
